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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Murray Casey Carter appeals from the district court's orders denying his request
for appointment of counsel in seeking Rule 35 relief and his Rule 35 motion. On appeal,
he asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for appointment of
counsel, finding his Rule 35 motion to be frivolous, based on clearly erroneous factual
findings and a misreading of the applicable law. In the alternative, he asserts that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion because it
improperly limited its discretion by failing to recognize that it had the authority to review
his entire sentence, not just the fixed portion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Murray Casey Carter was charged, by Information, with attempting to elude a
police officer, misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicants (second
within ten years) (hereinafter DUI), and driving without privileges.

(R., pp.34-36.)

Mr. Carter and the State reached a plea agreement, under the terms of which Mr. Carter
would plead guilty to attempting to elude a police officer and DUI, in exchange the State
would dismiss the driving without privileges charge, and recommend no more than a
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, for attempting to elude a police
officer, with any sentence on the DUI to be concurrent.

(Tr., p.5, L.16 - p.6, L.24.)

Pursuant to the agreement, Mr. Carter pied guilty to attempting to elude a police officer
and DUI. (Tr., p.21, Ls.5-22.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested a unified sentence of five years,
with two years fixed, on the attempting to elude charge, and a concurrent sentence of

1

one year on the DUI charge. (Tr., p.28, L.21

p.29, L.1.)

request a specific underlying sentence, but did ask the district court to place Mr. Carter
on probation.

(Tr., p.37, Ls.3-4.)

Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified

sentence of five years, with one year fixed, for attempting to elude, and a concurrent
sentence of one year for DUI. (Tr., p.43, L.17 - p.44, L.5.)
Mr. Carter filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.57.)
After filing his Notice of Appeal, Mr. Carter filed a timely Rule 35 motion in which
he requested that the indeterminate portion of his sentence be reduced from four years
to two years, which he supported with new information, namely his regular attendance
at "AA-NA meetings" and Celebrate Recovery meetings while awaiting a transfer to the
Therapeutic Community.

(R., pp.62-64.) He further requested that the district court

appoint counsel to assist him in seeking Rule 35 relief.

(R., pp.68-71.) The district

court denied his request for appointment of counsel, concluding that the Rule 35 motion
was "frivolous" (R., pp.79-80), and not surprisingly, denied his Rule 35 motion.
pp.82-84.)
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(R.,

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it refused to appoint counsel based on its
erroneous conclusion that Mr. Carter's Rule 35 motion was frivolous?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Carter's Rule 35
motion under the mistaken belief that its review power was limited to considering
only the fixed portion of his sentence?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Refused To Appoint Counsel Based On Its Erroneous
Conclusion That Mr. Carter's Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous

A

Introduction
When the district court denied Mr. Carter's motion for appointment of counsel in

pursuing his Rule 35 motion, it based its decision on a misstatement of the facts, which
led to its erroneous conclusion that the Rule 35 motion, which was supported by new
information, was frivolous. A review of the record and the law leads to the inevitable
conclusion that the district court committed legal error when it denied Mr. Carter's
motion for appointment of counsel, finding his Rule 35 motion to be frivolous, in light of
the clearly erroneous factual findings it made in support of its decision.
B.

Standard Of Review

The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, "A determination of whether a motion
for reduction of sentence is frivolous for purposes of applying I.C. § 19-852(b)(3)[1] is
based upon the contents of the motion itself and any accompanying documentation that
may support the motion ... [and] is one of law which we freely review." State v. Wade,
125 Idaho 522,526 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Refused To Appoint Counsel Based On
Its Erroneous Conclusion That Mr. Carter's Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous

In denying Mr. Carter's request for the appointment of counsel to assist him in
pursuing Rule 35 relief, the district court reasoned,
In this case, the Court sentenced Carter on January 8, 2014, for Count I.
Eluding a Police Officer, Felony, I.C. § 49-1401 and Count II. Operating a
Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol (Second Within Ten
1

This portion of the statute now appears in subsection (2)(c).
4

Years), Misdemeanor, I.C. §§ 18-8004, -8005(4). Carter complains about
both the indeterminate portion of four (4) years on Count I and one (1)
year on Count II, each count running concurrently; Defendant
Court to reduce his indeterminate time to two (2) years.
There was a plea agreement for two (2) years fixed, with three (3) years
indeterminate on Count I; the Court actually reduced the fixed time to one
(1) year.
In his Motion, he argues his sentence should be reduced to one (1) year,
with two (2) years fixed. Based on all of this, the Court finds that the
Motion "is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate
means would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a
frivolous proceeding." I.C. § 19-852(b)(3).[2]
(R., pp.79-80 (underlining in original).)
The problem with the district court's decision is that it relies on clearly erroneous
factual findings in concluding that the Rule 35 motion was frivolous. Mr.

plea

agreement did not include a provision that he and the State would jointly recommend a
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed. Instead, it provided that the State
would cap its recommendation at no more than five years, with two years fixed, with
Mr. Carter free to argue for probation. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-22 (defense counsel explaining
that, under the plea agreement, "the State will recommend a sentence in this matter that
the Court impose an aggregate five-year sentence, two years fixed followed by three
indeterminate . . . [and] I'm going to ask the Court to consider placing him on
probation."); Tr., p.25, Ls.7-11 (the district court, at the sentencing hearing, summarizing
the agreement as including a promise that "the State was going to cap its
recommendation on that count [attempting to elude] to five years with two plus - two
fixed followed by three indeterminate").)
In reaching its conclusion, the district court cited to Wade, which is particularly
telling, as Wade involved a plea agreement involving a joint recommendation, which is
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the district court erroneously believed was

in Mr.

case. In Wade, the

Court of Appeals concluded that the denial of Wade's motion for appointment of counsel
because his Rule 35 motion was frivolous was correct in light of the fact that the case
involved a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, Wade received the sentence for which he
bargained, and Wade provided no new information in support of the motion. Wade, 125
Idaho at 525-26. Mr. Carter's case is easily distinguished from Wade and the district
court's clearly erroneous factual findings. Not only did his plea agreement not include a
joint sentencing recommendation, his motion was supported by new information.
Because the factual findings underlying the district court's order denying
appointment of counsel on Mr. Carter's Rule 35 were clearly erroneous 3 and the legal
reasoning was unsound, Mr. Carter maintains that the proper relief is to vacate the
orders denying appointment of counsel and Rule 35 relief, and remand this matter for
appointment of counsel and reconsideration of the Rule 35 motion after Mr. Carter has
been assisted by appointed counsel.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Carter's Rule 35 Motion
Because It Mistakenly Believed That Its Review Power Was Limited To Considering
Only The Fixed Portion Of His Sentence4
In denying Rule 35 relief, the district court reasoned,
The fixed portion of a sentence imposed under the Unified Sentencing Act
is treated as the term of confinement for sentence review purposes. State
v. Hayes, 123 Idaho 26, 27, 843 P.2d 675, 676 (Ct. App. 1992). The
Court finds that a one-year fixed sentence for Eluding, Felony, I.C. 492

The language_quoted by the district court is now contained in subsection (2)(c).
On appeal, findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are "clearly erroneous."
See State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 789 (1997) (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a) and State v.
Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 87 (1993)).
4 If this Court grants the relief requested in section I, this argument will be moot.
3
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1401 is lenient considering the facts of this crime and is well within the
statutory sentence guidelines.
, p.83.)

The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Carter's Rule 35
motion because it mistakenly believed that its review of its original sentencing decision
was limited to the fixed portion of the sentence. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,
600 (1989) (trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to "'act0 within the outer boundaries
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific
choices"') (citation omitted). The problem with the district court's decision is that it relied
upon reasoning from the Court of Appeals that has been expressly disavowed by the
Idaho Supreme Court. See State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 202-03 (2007) ("We have
never held that we will not review the aggregate portion of a defendant's sentence to
see if it is reasonable under the facts of the case when the sentence is appealed.").
Because the district court's denial of Mr. Carter's Rule 35 motion was based on
its mistaken belief that its review power was limited, the district court abused its
discretion in denying Rule 35 relief. As such, Mr. Carter respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the order denying Rule 35 relief, and remand this matter for
reconsideration under the proper legal standards.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons

forth herein, Mr. Carter respectfully requests that this Court

vacate the orders denying appointment of counsel and Rule 35 relief, and remand this
matter for appointment of counsel and reconsideration of the Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 16 th day of July, 2014.
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SPEt-JCE~ J. HAHN
DeputyState Appellate Public Defender
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